4: Allen H-4 (no date) 1941 RD1 Ukraine RD1

again, after the offensive of General Brusilov had broken the Austro-Hungarian Front at several points. Part of Volhynia was cleared of the enemy and the Russians again invaded Galicia, occupying Stanislavov and also Czernowitz and the whole of the Bukovina. The Front was again removed from the region of Kiev.

Under the influence of the Russian victories the Roumanians entered the war, but they proved to be unprepared for serious conflict. A Russian army was sent to check the German invasion in Moldavia, and a new 'Roumanian Front' was created, so that the battle-line now ran from the Baltic to the Black Sea. During the winter of 1916–17 the South-Western Front was stabilized. Headquarters were planning a new offensive in the spring against Lvov and believed in its ultimate success. Peace and quiet reigned in Kiev and in the neighbourhood of the Front.(1)

§2. HRUSHEVSKY AND VINNICHENKO: THE UKRAINIANS AT BREST-LITOVSK

When the news of the February Revolution (February according to the Old Style, March according to the New) in Petrograd reached Kiev neither the authorities nor the populace would at first credit the truth of it. However, it was not long before the events which had taken place in the northern capital were repeated in Kiev and the cities of the Ukraine.

The process of decomposition which was destroying the armies of the North-Western and Western Fronts infected somewhat later the forces on the South-Western and Roumanian Fronts. As for the Ukrainian national movement, no one thought about it during those first days of revolution. With the exception of Finland, where the revolutionary movement was accompanied by a wave of feeling in favour of national independence, in no part of the Russian Empire were nationalist aspirations the motive of the Revolution. The first impulse of the masses, irrespective of their nationality, was to look upon the Revolution as a means of ending the war which had lasted too long. The other motives which soon made themselves apparent were everywhere of a social nature.

The state of mind of the masses found expression in the institution of 'Councils (*Soviety*) of Soldiers', Workmen's and Peasants' Delegates', in the creation of which all the leading socialist groups and parties took a hand. People of all nationalities participated in these Soviets; Georgian politicians, who for a generation had played a leading role in Russian radical movements, made themselves par-

4: Allen H-4 (no date) 1941 RD1 Ukraine RD1

ticularly prominent (Chkheidze, Tsereteli and Chenkeli really dominated the first Petrograd Soviet).

At this early period the great majority of the Ukrainian population were really more indifferent to 'the Ukrainian movement' than they had been before the war. The soldiers in the trenches were only interested in two things: in an immediate return to their homes and in their participation in the land distribution which was to be a feature of the agrarian reforms in the new Russia. If in a comparatively short time 'the Ukrainian movement' became a factor of importance in revolutionary Russia, it was only owing to the exceptional energy and insistence of the small group of men who were leading the Ukrainian nationalists.

Already in March Professor Hrushevsky had made his appearance in Kiev; he was joined by one of the activists of 1905, Vinnichenko, who during that earlier phase had called himself a 'Ukrainian Social Democrat'. The journalist Simon Petlyura, who was destined to become the most picturesque of the Ukrainian leaders, also turned up in Kiev.(2) At the beginning of 1917 Petlyura had found himself in the modest post of accountant in one of the branches of the 'Union of the Towns' which, together with the 'Union of Zemstvos', had been largely concerned with the supply problems of the war. These two Unions became the stronghold of the Ukrainian nationalists; in Kiev alone there were 6000 people employed on the 'Union of Zemstvos' and 2000 on the 'Union of the Towns'. Branches of the two Unions existed in all the towns of the Ukraine and the staffs consisted for the greater part of 'intelligentsia' and 'half-intelligentsia'—just the social strata where, before the war, the Ukrainian nationalists had been gaining recruits.

Without losing any time, Hrushevsky and Vinnichenko gathered round themselves in Kiev an active group who shared their ideas, and they began to organize a 'Ukrainian Conference'. The sponsors of the Conference sent 'invitations' to 'elect delegates' from the nine Governments which they considered as constituting the territory of the Ukraine (three Governments on the right and three on the left bank of the Dniepr and the three Governments of New Russia). The elections were held 'according to the Revolutionary ways': in other words, delegates arrived in Kiev on the authority of some small 'circle' or club or of a 'Ukrainian Revolutionary Committee' which might have consisted of five or six people. There appeared also 'self-appointed delegates'—deserters from the Front and 'new-comers' from Galicia.

No one was particularly astonished at this strange assembly, since 'revolutionary enthusiasm' reigned supreme throughout the whole

abroad for the benefit of the sufferers. On July 14, 1933, such a body was already formed in Lviv and soon in the other sections of Western Ukraine, while their appeals were heard by the Ukrainian emigrés abroad. 731 648

In August, Theodore Cardinal Innitzer of Vienna had been convinced of the truth of the famine and he appealed for aid for the starving. In the same month the General Secretary of the Congress of European Minorities published his summary of the conditions, as gleaned from all available sources, and the League took action at its meeting in September. In the same month the matter was brought up before the League of Nations in Geneva and relief was referred to the International Red Cross.

The movement spread to the Ukrainians in North America and on November 3, 1933, the sixth convention of the United Ukrainian Organizations of the United States appealed to the government of the United States, urging that an impartial commission be sent to Ukraine to report on the truth of these reports.

This growing wave of protests among the Ukrainians and the emigrants from Ukraine was met by a stony silence on the part of the Soviet authorities, by absolute denial or by charges of unfriendly propaganda. The Soviet government refused to lift its barrier on any visits to Ukraine by foreign journalists or by any foreign visitors until after the harvest of 1933 was brought in and then they induced such journalists as Walter Duranty to recant previous statements as to the extent of the famine and report on September 18, 1933, that the harvest of that year was excellent "and all talk of famine now is ridiculous." [208]

Almost the first detailed account of an American journalist was given by William Henry Chamberlin on May 29, 1934, on his return from the Soviet Union, when he estimated that between four and five million peasants were starving and he also quoted the speech of President Kalinin of the Soviet Union, made the year before, "The collective farmers have passed through a good school. For some, this school was quite ruthless." 731 185

This was a polite hint again that it had been the policy of the government to allow the famine to run its course in the hope of

725 668 of July. Thus, during this period of German retreat, the U. P. A. had been able to acquire large stores of munitions, which they could not hope easily to replace, once the major hostilities were over.

It was very soon evident that the efforts of the U. P. A. against the Soviet forces would take quite a different shape from their attacks on the Nazis. In the last stages of the war Stalin had organized many of the mobilized Ukrainians into various Ukrainian armies, so as to give the Western powers the idea that the Ukrainians were loyal to the Soviet Union. This added elements of a civil war to the struggle and the members of the U. P. A. decided to reduce their efforts against these Ukrainian forces of the Red Army and to substitute propaganda for a free Ukraine. In this respect they met with considerable success and through their masses of printed material and through personal contact, they more or less neutralized the Ukrainian divisions of the Red Army.

● [208] [186]

Instead, they concentrated their efforts against the NKVD detachments which were brought in from remote parts of the Soviet Union and in which the Russians formed the predominant personnel. It was the NKVD and the staffs of the Motor Tractor Stations who were now the chief part of the Soviet bureaucratic apparatus in the country and so the U. P. A. devoted its chief interest to working against these and to encouraging discontent on the collective farms, for the war was scarcely over when it was made clear that conditions were to be even stiffer and harder than they had been in the past.

[651] The war in the Ukraine had reduced the population to still worse depths of poverty than had been the case after 1918. Nevertheless, almost at once the villages were expected to make liberal gifts of grain to their beloved Stalin and the elder brothers, the Great Russians, who had, in the words of Stalin, won the victory over the Nazis and who would still protect them from the capitalists and warmongers of the West.

728 648 The events of the last months of fighting had shifted many of the organized forces of the U. P. A. to the Carpathian areas and this section which had struggled for its freedom against Hungary

5: Manning S-4 (no date) 1953 RD1 Ukraine RD1

in 1939, now received a new master. As soon as the Soviet forces entered the region in the autumn of 1944, they immediately began a campaign to liberate this area from Czecho-Slovakia and reunite it to the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic. It was the same old story carried on in the same way as in 1939. There was a mass of petitions apparently prepared by the native population asking for liberation, but these were in reality the work of a handful of carefully selected Communists.

They speedily reached their goal and on June 29, 1945, President Benes of Czechoslovakia recognized the justice of their claims and by an agreement handed over the entire province which was duly reunited with their brothers in Moscow. This brought together under the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic nearly all the Ukrainians, except a few who were still living in Poland and in a small stretch of territory which the UkSSR voluntarily ceded to Poland to satisfy the increasing claims of the Polish Communists and their needs in their efforts to cement their power in that state.

At the same time the realization by the Soviet authorities of the seriousness of the situation offered by the U. P. A. and the unrest among the Ukrainians led them to act on both the foreign and the domestic front. On the former they mobilized all of their friends and dupes abroad to stress the connection of the U. P. A., the "Bandera bandits," and the Nazi criminals and they achieved considerable success in closing the eyes of the west until they had won considerable victories over the various U. P. A. groups, for too many Western leaders failed to see the inconsistency that they preached. At one and the same time the Soviet authorities boasted of their complete control of the territory of Western Ukraine, thanks to the love of the population for the Red Army and in almost the same breath they declaimed against these armed forces which were holding up the advance of the Red Army and the NKVD in the very areas where the people were thirsting for liberation.

On the domestic front in the autumn of 1945 they sent a large force of men into the Carpathian area under the command of Khrushchov as Premier of the UkSSR and General Ryasny, the

6: Armstrong S-4 (no date) 1955 RD1 Ukraine RD1

chief of administration.[9] Having achieved this post, he repaid the organization which had assisted him by using his influence to secure the adherence to the OUN-M of the most important officials.[10]

While most of the economic and cultural divisions of the city government were left in the hands of local men, the OUN forces took care to organize the most important branches—propaganda and police—under their own followers. Zakhvalins'kyi was brought from Zhitomir to take command of the police units, but after a short period, in which his alleged incompetence and dissolute life made him objectionable to his party, he was replaced by one of the Galician leaders, Roman Bidar. Kandyba soon arrived to take charge of propaganda activity. With him came the staff of *Ukraïns'ke Slovo*, headed by John Rohach. The newspaper was to be printed in Kiev, but the destruction of the principal press by the explosions forced the editors to continue publication for some weeks in Zhitomir.[11]

Having captured Kiev, the German armies rapidly pushed on to the east, taking with them most of the interpreters and advisers who had formed an essential part of the OUN-M "conquest" of Zhitomir and Kiev. By the end of October, they had reached Kharkov, where Konyk took the lead in propaganda work. He and his assistants succeeded in recruiting a considerable number of the local intelligentsia for their organization but, as will be shown later, failed in their attempt to attain a high degree of success similar to that in Kiev.[12]

Lest repeated reference to collaboration of the Mel'nyk forces with the Wehrmacht lead to an exaggerated conception of the role of the OUN-M in the operations of the German army, it should be pointed out that the latter employed many Slavic interpreters and advisers in addition to the Mel'nyk followers. Some of these were Ukrainians, of all political persuasions, including Bandera supporters. Strong efforts were made to get rid of the latter after the decision to suppress their party, but for a

[9] Bahazii assumed the post on November 1 (*Nastup*, December 20, 1941, p. 2).
[10] Interviews 53, 65.
[11] Iurii Tarkovych in *Krakivs'ki Visti*, January 21, 1942, p. 2; *Nastup*, November 8, 1941, p. 3; Interview 65.
[12] See Chapter X.

6: Armstrong S-4 (no date) 1955 RD1 Ukraine RD1

most of the peasantry seem to have responded favorably.[63] Frustrating delays ensued throughout a large part of the Ukraine, however, especially in the Reichskommissariat. In part they were due to misplaced German thoroughness in requiring exact surveys of the land before proceeding to its division among the households in the *Landbaugenossenschaft*. More serious was the deliberate obstruction of Koch and others who, feeling that the program would leave some small segment of life free of their control, argued that it would result in reduced deliveries. As a result, only 10 percent instead of the planned 20 percent of *Gemeinwirtschaften* were converted to *Landbaugenossenschaften*.[64] In spite of the meager practical results, the de-collectivization program was a favorite theme of Koch's propaganda, doubtless because he allowed so little else of a positive nature even to be discussed. In the end, however, the constantly broken pledges unquestionably caused a loss of faith in the Germans, even a willingness to return to the known evils of the Soviet system. The peasant's saying, "A bad mother is still better than a step-mother who makes many promises," indicated his judgment of the German agricultural policy.[65]

The problem of securing agricultural supplies was closely connected with that of supplying the Ukrainian urban population with food. One way in which the Germans sought to obtain most of the farm products for their own use was to make practically no provision for feeding the city dwellers. This was especially true during the first winter. The concept was simple: the starving urban population would find some means, through barter or otherwise, of inducing the peasants to part with an extra, hidden supply of food beyond that which the Germans had been able to

[63] Cf. for example Report of Ortskommandantur Melitopol', July 8, 1942, PS 1693 (hereafter referred to as PS 1693); Report No. 7 of Representative of Reichsministerium für die besetzten Ostgebiete at Heeresgruppe Mitte and Stab des Befehlshabers des ruckwärtigen Heeresgebiets Mitte Captain Müller, March 24, 1942, to Reichsministerium für die besetzten Ostgebiete, PS 1686 (hereafter referred to as PS 1686).

[64] Memorandum by Bräutigam, October 25, 1942, PS 294 (hereafter referred to as PS 294).

[65] Situation report, Wirtschaftinspektorat Süd Ic, April, 1942, NG 1089 (hereafter referred to as NG 1089); Memorandum of Generalkommissar for the Crimea, Alfred Frauenfeld, to Himmler, February 10, 1944, NO 5394 (hereafter referred to as NO 5394).

6: Armstrong S-4 (no date) 1955 RD1 Ukraine RD1

violently denounced by the Soviet rulers, it is likely that a large part of the intelligentsia was "liquidated as a class."

At the same time,[1] a certain outlet was offered to nationalist feeling, with a class-conscious twist, by emphasizing the heroic feats of certain Ukrainian leaders of Red partisan units in the L'vov area.[37] This theme was relatively subdued, however, probably because there were not enough Ukrainian subjects suitable for glorification. In the Carpatho-Ukraine, where the Red partisans had evidently attracted genuine support as liberators from the de-nationalizing Hungarian regime, the tactic was employed much more extensively. Whole lists of partisan leaders, including at least one priest, were published. Moreover, one partisan was explicitly declared to speak "pure Ukrainian," and apparently all bore Ukrainian names.[38] This propaganda was followed up by the customary practice of forming a People's Committee which requested union of the province with the Soviet Union.[39] Even after the war was ended and the new acquisition securely incorporated into the Soviet Ukraine, however, an article was published which, had it been written by a non-Communist, would have been denounced as "racist." It was stated that some villages in the Carpatho-Ukraine spoke only Magyar, but that their "purely Ukrainian" character was shown by the family names of the inhabitants and their "Slavic appearance."[40]

Fortunately for them, the majority of the West Ukrainian nationalist intelligentsia did not stay behind to enjoy the benefits of Soviet "re-education." It is one of the strange paradoxes of German-Ukrainian relations during the war, however, that at the very period when Germany was most in need of securing Ukrainian support, and when a minimal amount of such assistance was being developed in the form of the Galician Division, a new wave of repression fell upon the nationalist leaders. This occurred in the fall of 1943; its immediate causes cannot be determined, but it appears that it was basically a result of that tendency to strive for large results by employing force and trickery which marred

[37] *Pravda Ukrainy*, July 26, 1945, p. 3.
[38] *Radians'ka Ukraïna*, December 14, 1944, p. 2.
[39] *Radians'ka Ukraïna*, December 23, 1944, p. 2.
[40] *Pravda Ukrainy*, July 28, 1945, p. 3.

[1] [after the Ukraine was conquered by the Red Army in 1944.-- Analyst]

6: Armstrong S-4 (no date) 1955 RD1 Ukraine RD1

IX. CHANNELS OF NATIONALIST ACTIVITY

[795] 668* THOUGH the church did in some measure provide an institutional framework through which nationalist sentiment could be expressed, its usefulness for the propagation of a political doctrine was necessarily limited. Such organizational channels were essential to the nationalist movements if they were to achieve large-scale results in the occupied East Ukraine. To be sure, the underground parties themselves provided a network of contacts and a minimum of central direction. In comparison with the vast area to be covered—populated in 1941–43, even after wartime dislocations, by thirty millions—resources under their direct control [208] were microscopic. Clandestine publications could be issued by mimeograph machines or small hand presses and circulated from one trusted individual to another. Such propaganda could, however, reach only a few thousand. As underground groups, the nationalist parties necessarily had extremely small memberships. For example, a group of twelve members of the OUN-B in Kramatorskaia (Kremators'ka) in the Donbas is referred to by one of the leaders of the party in that area as a "big" cell.[1] Again, the entire number of active OUN-M workers in Kiev in late 1942 never exceeded thirty.[2] It is certain that the members of each of the OUN organizations in the chief cities after early 1942 could be counted in dozens and that the total number of active workers in the East Ukraine numbered only a few hundred.

For a conspiratorial organization, however, the number of members is not necessarily a criterion of effectiveness. By infiltrating key positions in public institutions, the nationalist parties might obtain influence out of all proportion to the number of their adherents. Moreover, even when centrally organized parties like

[1] Interview 66.
[2] Interview 65.

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6: Armstrong S-4 (no date) 1955 RD1 Ukraine RD1

not find the Prosvita organization well adapted to its tactic of underground work after German suppression.[56] On the other hand, the extremely important Kharkov Prosvita was organized almost entirely by local residents who had in many cases been associated with the Prosvita of pre-Soviet days, and who were unassociated with, or even to some extent hostile to, the OUN-M.[57] Here again there is strong indication of the survival in the East Ukraine of leadership capable of taking direction of important aspects of national life. That this leadership was directed to such a considerable extent to the less aggressive aspects of national development, however, indicates that a certain gap existed during the war years between nationalism in the East and the West Ukraine.

The means employed in the educational systems and in the cultural societies for propagating the national ideology can be classed for the most part under the heading of oral propaganda. The face-to-face type of communication has a long history of effective use in the east Slavic countries and, under the name "oral agitation," has been widely cultivated as a means of strengthening the Communist regime. Hence the population was used to this type of propaganda. Moreover, it was especially suited to the work of the nationalist groups, which were seeking to spread ideas frowned upon by the German authorities. The latter could suppress a performance or dissolve a society, arrest or execute a leader, but with their small number of personnel, their ignorance of the language, and their lack of sufficiently numerous and reliable local agents, they could not overhear everything and thus prevent the clever teacher or cultural worker from communicating political concepts to his audience. Since nationalist propagandists were so few and ill-equipped by organization and training to cope with the gigantic task of indoctrinating a population of thirty million, however, the problem of securing access to mass communication media under control of the propaganda departments of the municipal administrations was vitally important. Through such media nationalism might reach thousands

[56] Interview 61.
[57] Interviews 57, 73.

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where oral methods by the same number of agitators reached scores and live theatrical performances reached hundreds.

The principal activity of the propaganda department of a Ukrainian municipal administration under German occupation centered around the local newspaper, for other media such as the radio and motion pictures were under complete German control. It is worth devoting considerable attention to journalistic activity throughout the East Ukraine because of the value such study can have in elucidating the whole problem of the extent of nationalist activity in that area. Newspapers not only reached large numbers, but represented a symbol of authoritative pronouncement to a people accustomed to viewing the statements of the Soviet press as announcements of policy not subject to question.[58]

However much the German authorities may have feared the existence of a Ukrainian press, it was absolutely essential for them to authorize and support it for their own purposes. Under the Wehrmacht administration, especially in the early days, a very nonrestrictive policy was pursued, as was indicated by the ideologically independent nature of *Ukraïns'ke Slovo* in Zhitomir and Kiev. General ground rules laid down included prohibition of the term "Ukraine" in the sense of a state, rather than as a territorial expression; insistence on reference to Germany as the "protector" of the Ukraine, rather than as an "ally"; and designation of the Wehrmacht as "saviors" rather than "occupiers."[59] Under army control newspapers sprang up in scores of towns, including all of the important cities of the East Ukraine, although in at least one (Poltava) the establishment of a paper was considerably delayed by the unwillingness of any officer to accept the responsibility of censoring it.[60] One reason for the Wehrmacht's

[58] There is considerably more information available on newspaper activity than on other politically significant aspects of the East Ukraine. Since many of the observers who have written accounts of the war period were themselves journalists they naturally paid considerable attention to this field of activity. Moreover, the West Ukrainian newspapers published during the same period, which furnish the principal source of material on the East Ukraine, were also especially interested in journalistic enterprises. Consequently, one must guard against the assumption that the real importance of these newspapers was as great as the attention devoted to them indicates. Nevertheless, they were unquestionably very significant as means of transmitting nationalism and reflecting national feeling.

[59] PS 053.

[60] USSR Exhibit 278.

6: Armstrong S-4 (no date) 1955 RD1 Ukraine RD1

writers.[46] To a certain extent it may be due to resentment against the clerical workers' unresponsiveness to nationalist propaganda, or even to simple snobbery toward those aspiring to the title of "intelligentsia" without a formal education. In part it appears, however, to correspond to a real lack of breadth of mind among this lowest group of the Soviet intelligentsia, a deficiency which would have made it difficult to use them for any political or social movement not tied immediately to their customary frame of thinking.

On the other hand, there were often elements in the villages which were available for some sort of political activity. The memory of Petliura was still present; some refused to believe that he was dead, thinking the story to be Communist propaganda.[47] In another area, both the president of the village soviet and the head of one of the collective farms remained behind and organized life in cooperation with nationalist elements.[48] Yet, in another case, a man of some education in one of the villages, who was related to an émigré minister of the UNR, after expressing fervently nationalist sentiments, recoiled with horror at the idea that his auditor might recommend him to the Germans for an official post, fearing the vengeance of Communist agents.[49] The presence of the latter was, indeed, a great handicap to nationalist organization in the rural areas, where the protection of the police force was not so great (especially in partisan-infested areas) as in the towns, and where the naturally cautious peasant hesitated to commit himself until assured the Soviet administration would never return.[50]

Since the organized nationalist forces were so few in members, they could not undertake any direct or continuous indoctrination of the rural population, unless they abandoned their efforts to win the cities. They had to rely primarily on the Prosvita branches, the country schools, and the village administrations. Printed material was also used whenever it could be controlled

[46] *Krakivs'ki Visti*, September 23, 1941, p. 2, reprinting an article from *L'vivs'ki Visti*.
[47] R. Sutor in *Krakivs'ki Visti*, June 13, 1942, p. 4.
[48] R. Sutor in *Krakivs'ki Visti*, July 31, 1942, p. 3.
[49] R. Sutor in *Krakivs'ki Visti*, June 13, 1942, p. 4.
[50] R. Sutor in *Krakivs'ki Visti*, July 31, 1942, p. 3.

6: Armstrong S-4 (no date) 1955 RD1 Ukraine RD1

by nationalist Ukrainians. As a matter of fact, a large proportion of the newspapers in the smaller towns were directed principally at rural readers; the extreme shortage of papers[51] in many areas prevented their being of great influence even when they had some nationalist content. Moreover, the central periodical for farmers, *Ukraïns'kyi Khliborob*, with a weekly printing of seventy thousand, was edited by Eugene Arkypenko, who later joined the Vlasov movement.[52] While this publication was not used against the nationalist cause, it was devoid of positive nationalist material, being confined entirely to technical agricultural articles.

The less-than-lukewarm supporters of the nationalist movements who constituted the bulk of the personnel in positions which provided access to the rural population apparently did not do a great deal to convert the dormant cultural nationality of the peasants into active nationalism. There is no question that the cities inevitably constituted a prime target for nationalist efforts. Probably, in view of the severe limitations imposed by lack of time and nationalist personnel, by Red partisans and German restrictions, the enormous task of overcoming village inertia toward a purely political movement could not have been carried out in any case. Nevertheless, the initial failure of the nationalist groups (at least the OUN and others coming from the west) to grasp the overriding importance of the land question, and the necessity of making this a prime means by which the rural population could be won to the nationalist cause, must certainly be ranked as one of the great lost opportunities of this period. If the nationalists had from the beginning used all their energies to present a positive program of agrarian reform as the heart of their message, they might not have left any tangible organization to withstand renewed Soviet occupation, but they might have left behind a concept of the Ukrainian nationalist movement as a defender of the interests of the peasantry. This, along with the vaguer memories of the Republican era, might have left an enduring imprint on the peasantry.

[51] D. Myronovych in *Krakivs'ki Visti*, July 9, 1942, p. 4.
[52] *Volyn'*, June 17, 1942, p. 4; Interview 45.

[Volhynia] [Ruthenia]

186 Nothing happened there which their special reporters did not describe in detail. In neighboring Volhynia which, for easier Polonization, was separated from Galicia by a Chinese wall, /83/ and where Ukrainian newspapers from Lwów were forbidden, people paid two zloty, the equivalent of two marks, for the smuggled papers. Radios were much in demand, and the cooperatives which ordinarily sold shoelaces, underwear and soap, were suddenly supposed to furnish radio sets. The members wanted it. They brought their zloty, and when these did not suffice they paid in chickens and eggs. Half the village listened to the reports from a friendly broadcasting station in the Ukrainian language, picked up by a common receiving set. The people did not mind at all that they were obliged to stand or squat as close together as sardines in a can.

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The "audition" cost five groschen which amounts to two and one-half pfennig. Anyone who had no money paid with an egg for news taken from the ether. What they heard on these occasions were sometimes their own wish-dreams. The autonomous government, which set up its residence first in Uzhgorod and then, until the country's reintegration into Hungary, in Khust, had great plans. The listeners discussed this with great animation.

648 186 208

The peasants who could write set down on paper the result of long deliberation about existing conditions as well as their wishes for the future, in the form of letters and sent them to the Polish President as well as to the Carpatho-Ukrainian Prime Minister Voloshyn and to a foreign statesman from whom they hoped to get help. Most of these letters got only as far as the office of the voivode. Thereupon Poland's fist became day by day more oppressive. The autonomy of the neighboring small country, however meager it was, was a violent shock to Polish power. Warsaw desired the quickest possible disappearance of Carpatho-Ukraine. On December third the head of

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1 [i.e., 1938-39 among the Ukrainians in Volhynia - Andy]

Fine Arts in the Ukraine

By M. Buračeк

532 /401/ Ukrainian literature had important representatives already in the first half of the nineteenth century whereas the fine arts did not produce any names of importance till the end of the century. But the actual development of the fine arts in the Ukraine started only in the twentieth century, the years after the revolution being the most decisive ones for the further development of the fine arts.

• [208] During the civil war art played an important part in propaganda and agitation. Millions of posters, slogans, and illustrations flooded the country. Demonstrations, theatrical performances, manifestations of all sorts of programs of the various "fronts" -- fronts of the industrial areas, of the rural areas, of the educational realm, of sanitary measures -- all these required the cooperation of the artist. A number of "peasant homes" in Kiev, Kharkov, Odessa, Dniepropetrovsk and other cities as well as soldiers' barracks, clubs, etc. were ornamented with fresco paintings, ornaments and decorations.

Easel painting was virtually unknown. This was proved in 1918 in the "Exhibition of Ukrainian Artists", where the paintings exhibited were small in number and had no special qualities. In 1920, in a small room in Kiev, another exhibition of paintings was shown, and once more it had no broad character. Only at the beginning of 1925, at the opening of the so-called Fair of the 'Kontrakty' /a special section of the city of Kiev/ in Kiev, a rather interesting exhibition was shown in which not only painters but also graphic artists and sculptors participated.

When, after the civil war, attention was paid to economic reconstruction, the role of the artist in social life also changed. Draftsmen were employed as illustrators and caricaturists. The publishing houses ordered dust jackets, book illustrations, original type, and the like, from the artists. Painters went to work on portraits of statesmen and theatrical designs. Since that time, art for art's sake is on its way out, and the artists are entering more and more into the service of everyday life and economy. The gap between art and life becomes smaller and smaller. Of course, art is not exclusively dedicated to utilitarian purposes. At the same time, the artists are in search of a new language, of a new style. And eventually the time came when this search brought about a grouping together of the artists in a firm organization.

In 1926, upon the initiative of the artists, F. Krycevs'kyj, Kozik,